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Introduction 
The overall purpose of the article is to show the philosophical 
background that stands behind monotheism. Therefore, we will focus 
mainly on how rationality and morality complement one another thus 
allowing for the formation of what we can loosely refer to as the 
monotheistic Weltanschauung.       
 The birth of Monotheism is what we loosely associate with the 
ancient Jews, nevertheless, in itself monotheism is not a Hebrew 
invention, since it was already practiced in ancient Egypt where it, 
however, took on an animistic form that was connected with the cult 
of the sun god. Therefore, the fundamental feature that separated the 
monotheistic God of the Jews from other deities of the ancient world 
is that the animistic gods where believed to reside within nature. In a 
sense they could be said to be nothing more than symbolical 
representations of the natural world. Yahweh, on the other hand, 
exceeded nature; He did not exist in it, but rather outside of it in the 
sense that nature was his creation. Subsequently, rationality and 
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morality were the two most important qualities that were ascribed to 
Him. Thus much as the ancient gods were considered to be capricious 
and amoral, the monotheistic God was believed to be the source of 
morality and rationality, two qualities that contributed to his alleged 
superiority. 
 However, superiority has its price which in this case is alienation. 
In other words, if God is to be regarded as a superior being, “He” 
(there is no way out of the masculinization in Judeo-Christianity) must 
be, at the same time, detached from reality; thus there is what can be 
called an ontological gap between being and beings, a gap that is 
fundamentally made up for by epistemology in the sense that God 
unconceals Himself basically in a linguistic way. What is meant here 
is that the linguistic order that is imposed on the character of the 
natural universe (God creates the world from the ether of the word) 
finds its reflection in a linguistic order that encroaches upon human 
moral life, which takes the form of the Decalogue.  
 
Rationality and the status of reality 
Another feature that is important about the character of the 
monotheistic God is that He is a being that created the world ex-
nihilo, which is an attribute that makes Him different from Plato’s 
Demiurge who basically does not so much create the world as simply 
put it in order, i.e. assemble it like a puzzle from the eternal 
paradeigma (Windelband, p. 130). The Biblical God, on the other 
hand, is the primordial cause of everything that exists and this 
includes the paradeigma, which appear under the countenance of the 
word.     
 Of course, such an understanding of divinity creates numerous 
problems; one of them regards the question whether reality is rational 
in itself or if it is imposed on the indifferent natural universe from the 
outside. The former view assumes that reality - like Hegel, for 
example maintains - is rational from the very beginning and that the 
natural world is composed out of ontological categories. Therefore, 
Levinas seems to be echoing Hegel when he claims that, “[r]ationality 
has to be understood as the incessant emergence of thought from the 
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energy of ‘being’s move’ or its manifestation, and reason has to be 
understood out of this rationality” (“God and Philosophy,” p 167). 
 In other words, all that we have to do is find the links between the 
different layers of being understood otherwise as the different cycles 
of nature. The other view, which appears in the philosophy of Kant, 
states that reality is meaningless in itself until it is activated by the 
mind. Thus just like divine intelligence activates the universe into 
being, the subjective mind activates the universe into meaning by 
imposing certain categories on the organics of the natural world. In 
other words, categories like time, space, quality, quantity do not exist 
in themselves but are brought into experience by the environment of 
the mind that renders things meaningful. Bearing that in mind Levinas 
states that: 
Kantian philosophy itself [le criticism], which has lent reason its form and figure, 
was still misled by a traditional logic accepted as fixed, and needed a 
phenomenology, whether Hegelian – overcoming the separations of logical 
understanding by a form of reason in movement, or, more humbly but more 
radically, Husserlian-seeking full lucidity on the hither side of logic in a living 
present, in its proto-impressions and their syntheses and “passive explications.” 
      (Outside the Subject, p. 31) 
To move from Kant to Hegel is to substitute epistemology for 
ontology in the sense that meaning is a phenomenon that can be 
respectively seen to exist in the mind or in the world. In other words, 
Hegel’s system is endorsed by religion, whilst Kant’s by science. 
 Kant’s privileging of subjectivity has similar consequences to the 
ones that we find with regard to the ultimate being. In other words, 
God’s superiority simultaneously leads to his alienation from beings. 
As it is, we can approach the notion of the human self in quite a 
similar way, i.e. if the self, the seat of the epistemological categories is 
to be the most superior being on earth then, it must, at the same time, 
be detached and alienated from other (inferior) beings. Therefore, 
there is an ontological gap separating God from the self just as there is 
a gap separating the self from the animalistic and vegetative universe. 
The Biblical phrase that human beings should “have dominion over 
the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, 
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and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping 
thing that creeps upon the earth” (Genesis, 1:26) points not only to 
human superiority but also to their alienation. Moreover, it is a 
statement that speaks volumes for the metaphysical understanding of 
the self and the world. From this perspective reality does not have 
much value in itself; its only merit stems from its appropriation of the 
norms, needs and desires of the human self.  
 A completely different approach to being and the natural world can 
be found in animisms like Taoism which clearly states that the goal of 
existence dwells not in overcoming nature but in submitting oneself to 
it (Smith, p. 232). In other words, the self should seek to incorporate 
itself into the structure of the Brahmanic universe. The onto-
theological perspective, on the other hand, states that the natural 
universe should be incorporated into the existential and cognitive 
structures of the self. 
 Thus just as God unconceals Himself to human beings through the 
medium of morality and rationality, human beings unconceal 
themselves to the world in the same way, i.e. as rational and moral 
agents. This is why human beings appear to be beings that are 
supposedly superior to other earthly existents, since they are detached 
from them by the fact that they are rational and moral, where the latter 
is a quality that gives the former a certain sense of direction. In other 
words, morality anticipates rationality which brings us very close to 
the views of Levinas whose philosophy is built on the foundation that 
ethics serves as the foundation of metaphysics. As it is, both morality 
and rationality help the human self to overcome the gap separating it 
from other existents, yet it is morality that functions as the self’s 
primordial condition. 
 Therefore, the idea of the Good which is the basis of monotheistic 
ethics is what Levinas places over the concept of truth which the 
theological tradition sees as a variety or a synonym of the Good. 
Therefore, from the theological point of view the Good is reduced to a 
rationalistic understanding of truth. In the Levinasian sense, on the 
other hand, the idea of the Good is otherwise than being which means 
that it is not reducible to the category of truth. In itself it is expressed 
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in the face of the other. In other words, the Good is what the self 
produces not in itself and for itself but in its responsibility for the 
other, i.e. it is a certain understanding of truth that prevails in a given 
historical epoch, therefore, it is what makes historical renditions of 
goodness and truth possible. We see, therefore, that from this 
perspective the understanding of truth derives and is dependent on the 
notion of the Good whose understanding brings Levinas close to 
Platonism where the Good is conceived as the highest idea and the 
source of all illumination that Levinas compares to the idea of the 
Thou developed by Buber, for he claims that, “the light of the Thou – 
just as the intelligible sun in Plato, the idea of the Good, and the 
phosphorescence of the Sein des Seinden later on in Heidegger [are] 
the primal truth which is the source of all other truths” (“Martin Buber 
and the Theory of Knowledge,” p. 72). 
 However, Levinas is also indebted to Aristotle’s conception of God 
as an ens perfectissimum that in itself does not do anything more than 
inspire things with the will to attain a state of perfectness which is 
reflected in the human need of the Good, i.e. of the constant need of 
development. Like many others Levinas also wonders about how the 
perfectness of God can preserve its perfectness on the background of 
an imperfect world: 
The theory of knowledge is a theory of truth. Like the Parmenides of Plato it 
poses the question: how can the absolute being manifest itself in truth? For to be 
known, it must manifest itself in the world where error is possible. How can a 
being, subject to error, touch the absolute being without impairing its absolute 
character? It is reasonable to suggest that the efforts of ancient Greek philosophy 
were largely devoted to this question of how to mediate between appearance and 
reality. For in a universe conceived as a single whole, the gap between the two 
had to be bridged; and it was assumed that the mind need only reflect on itself to 
discover the One from which it derived. 
       (Ibid., p. 60) 
Subsequently, Levinas maintains that nothing can justify the existence 
of evil. Therefore, he rejects all attempts of the rationalization of evil 
and suffering that try to find an ethical justification to suffering like 
we find, for example, in the Biblical case of Job. However, much as 
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suffering is meaningless from an individual self’s temporal 
perspective, it acquires meaning once we bring the other onto the 
scene, since then the self feels responsible not only for itself but for 
the suffering of the other.  
 What this means is that we have to bracket the conventional 
understanding of time as an objective and progressing continuum. It 
seems that our conventional temporality that is governed by the past-
present-future referentiality does not accord with divine temporality. 
The standard understanding of time comes into being only from the 
moment of the creation of the world. Eo ipso, the world was not 
created earlier than it was, since there was no before as time came into 
being together with the world. 
 The Augustinian conception of time that we are developing here is 
similar to the one that many centuries later we find in Bergson, i.e. 
both thinkers believe - in their own ways - that the conventional 
division of time into past-present-future is only that, i.e. a convention 
of the mind. What this means is that in God there exists something 
like an eternal present. Charles Taylor explains the Augustinian 
understanding of time in the following way, “[t]he past, which 
‘objectively’ exists no more, is here in my present; it shapes this 
moment in which I turn to a future, which objectively is not yet, but 
which is here qua project”(p. 56). In other words, St. Augustine thinks 
that only the present is really real by saying that when we actually talk 
about reminiscences we still experience them in the present. Idem per 
idem, the precise definition of the past should be that of past 
experiences “called out” in the present. The same thing applies to the 
future. What this means is that the past is based on memory, whereas 
the future on the idea of anticipation and expectation. However, just as 
with the past, the future is a phenomenon that takes place in the 
present, so once again when we talk about the future the precise 
formula should be future as experienced in the present. In addition to 
that from the Augustinian perspective time is phenomenon that we 
experience subjectively.    
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Suffering, fear and the unconcealment of moral thinking  
Returning to the idea of suffering that was mentioned a while ago we 
come to see that for Levinas the suffering of the other causes the self 
to feel the need to respond. Levinas holds that, “[t]he vortex – 
suffering of the other, my pity for his suffering his pain over my pity, 
my pain over his pain, etc. – stops at me. The I is what involves one 
movement more in this iteration. My suffering is the cynosure of all 
the sufferings – and of all the faults, even of the fault of my 
persecutors, which amounts to suffering the ultimate persecution, 
suffering absolutely” (“Substitution,” p. 122). In other words, 
suffering is a condition that enhances the development of selfhood and 
the only way in which it can be made meaningful is when the self tries 
to take responsibility for the suffering of the other, since otherwise 
suffering contributes to the self’s anonymity. What this means is that 
the suffering of the other, which obliges the self to take action, 
represents an ethical moment, perhaps even the first ethical moment. 
 The self responds to the other basically in a positive way through 
responsibility or in a negative way through resentment. As it is, both 
qualities refer to the self’s dependency on the existence of the other, 
of the need to respond to the other. This is why following Levinas we 
can speak of the self as being taken hostage by the other, i.e. Levinas 
declares that the “subject is a hostage” (Ibid., p. 101). Nevertheless, 
the obsession with the other and the self’s responsibility or resentment 
of it raise the self into awareness and cognitive being which, at the 
same time, makes it clear that the self is a moral entity before it can be 
understood as a rational one.  
 Generally speaking the Judeo-Christian moral system derives from 
the Decalogue that Moses brings down with himself from Mount 
Sinai. One of the problems that one is faced with when looking at the 
Commandments is the negativism that they express. Nine out of the 
Ten Commandments are negative in the sense that they are nothing 
more than prohibitions. It seems almost that if one refrains from doing 
evil, one is sure to do good. There is, however, a rational explanation 
to the overall negativism that we find in the structure of the 
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Decalogue. The prohibitive morality is the remnant of the old taboo 
morality which in itself stems from the existential fear of being.  
 The notion of fear brings us to the idea of individuality. What must 
be remembered is that the most important reason why we want to put 
a meaningful construction on our existence is that we are 
fundamentally mortal beings. If we refer to the words of the Buddha, 
what we learn is that the primordial constitution of being is 
temporality:  
Then the Buddha addressed all the monks once more, and these were the very last 
words he spoke: 
"Behold, O monks, this is my last advice to you. All component things in the 
world are changeable. They are not lasting. Work hard to gain your own 
salvation." 
Then the Buddha lapsed into the jhana stages, or meditative absorptions. Going 
from level to level, one after the other, ever deeper and deeper. Then he came out 
of the meditative absorption for the last time and passed into nirvana, leaving 
nothing whatever behind that can cause rebirth again in this or any other world. 
(Buddhist Studies: http://www.buddhanet.net/e-
learning/buddhism/lifebuddha/2_31lbud.htm [last access 09.05.12]) 
In other words, we should learn to look at being not in a quidditative 
sense but in a verbal one. Thus the Buddhist understanding of being is 
“Panta Rheist.” If so, then, we must also look at ourselves as beings 
that are fundamentally temporal and, therefore, finite. However, 
human beings more than being simply mortal are also beings that live 
with the awareness of finitude. This means that the awareness of 
finitude obliges us to put on a meaningful construction on being. We 
may even say that if it was not for the fact that we are mortal, life 
would not have to mean anything at all. The quest for meaning which 
is as inevitable as breathing makes sense only on the background of 
finitude. In other words, rationality and morality are not the primordial 
attributes of human being; rather, we are socialized into the rational 
and moral paradigms and these two conditions allow us to deal with 
temporality. The view presented above accords with the Heideggerian 
idea of being-towards-death that Levinas, however, rejects, since for 
him death is a mystery, which is why it cannot constitute the self’s 
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ultimate horizon in whose foreground the being of selfhood makes 
sense: 
Being toward death, in Heidegger’s authentic existence, is a supreme lucidity and 
hence a supreme virility. It is Dasein’s assumption of the uttermost possibility of 
existence, which precisely makes possible all other possibilities, and consequently 
makes possible the very feat of grasping a possibility – that is, it makes possible 
activity in freedom. Death in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for me 
the subject seems to reach the limit of the possible in suffering. It finds itself 
enchained, overwhelmed, and in some way passive.  
     (“Time and the Other,” pp. 40-41) 
Thus for Levinas it is suffering and not death that is constructive in 
the formation of selfhood. Generally speaking never are we as self-
conscious of ourselves as in moments of intense fear and pain. This is 
why consciousness can be considered to be based on the memorization 
of trauma, i.e. the traumatic moments that shaped civilization have 
been committed to the collective memory of humanity and this is what 
we loosely call consciousness.    
 Availing ourselves of the Biblical tradition we come to find that 
suffering is the major theme of The Book of Job. For our part we 
would like to focus on a certain aspect of the text when Job pushed to 
the brink of despair asks what we can loosely refer to as the “why 
question” that is repeated five times:  
3:11Why did I not die at birth, 
Come forth from the womb and  
Expire? 
3:12Why were there knees to  
receive me, 
or breast for me to suck? 
3:16 Or why was I not buried like a  
stillborn child, 
like an infant that never sees 
the light? 
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3:20 “Why is light given to one in  
misery, 
and life to the bitter in soul… 
3:23 Why is light given to one who 
cannot see the way, 
whom God had forced in? 
(“The Book of Job,” 3.11-3.23) 
Job’s question is at base an existentialist one that might as well be 
expressed by writers like Camus. Nevertheless, we would like to 
compare Job’s question to the notion of thaumazein (wonder). For the 
Greeks knowledge stemmed from wonder and was associated with the 
so called objective point of view that one could reach after 
“disinteresting” oneself from embodied being (emotions, intuitions, 
practical existential abilities, traditional folk knowledge, etc.). 
Nevertheless, knowledge so understood demands certain kinds of 
actions that would allow us to detach ourselves from the embodied 
being and this is where ethics comes into play. The point of ethics is, 
therefore, to desubjectify experience and to discover universal and 
objective modes of conduct that are the product of reason and not the 
heart. Individuality, from this perspective is understood as a failure in 
the sense that it distorts human behavior, since instead of living in 
accordance with universal principles, we find ourselves simply 
satisfying our private desires. Needless to say, the question of the real 
and unreal comes into play at this point. Of course, reality for the 
Greeks is associated with the universal laws of being that serve as the 
foundation of all metaphysics. Physics, on the other hand, is bodily, 
subjective and, therefore, unreal, since it is limited to an 
individualized perspective not to a universal one that would appeal to 
everyone regardless of time, place or character. This is why 
mathematics played such an important role in the intellectual life of 
the Greeks, since its truths were supposedly not true for today but for 
yesterday as well as tomorrow. Thus much as the Greeks are credited 
with the discovery of philosophy, they should also be credited with the 
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discovery of science which is after all based on the disclosure of the 
universal laws of nature. 
 Nevertheless, in addition to the Greeks, Judaism also had a 
tremendous impact on the shaping of the Western self. After all 
Numenius is believed to have said that: “Plato was Moses talking 
Greek” (as quoted in Hamlyn, p. 75). Therefore, the intellectuality of 
the Western world was modeled on the disinterested perspective of the 
Greeks; however, the Hebrew tradition which in itself contradicts the 
Hellenic intellectual paradigm also exercised a major influence on the 
Western world. Nevertheless, much as the Greeks looked for that 
which was universal, the Hebrews focused on their own uniqueness 
and on human particularity. 
 However, what the two perspectives share is the idea of 
detachment. Much as the Greeks detached themselves from the world 
of nature, the ancient Jews detached themselves from the world of 
prevailing cultures which is what led some commentators to say that 
this was the only reason why an insignificant group of nomads 
managed to survive in spite of all odds (Smith, p. 225).  
 The Jews detached themselves from other cultures and they 
believed that God had revealed himself to them in particular. The a-
historical world of reason that was open to all was in this way 
replaced by a historical world revealed especially to a given group of 
people. One of the leading thinkers of the seventeenth century Blaise 
Pascal believed that the Judeo-Christian God was embodied in the 
world of life; in other words, this was not the god of Plato or Aristotle 
that existed in some metaphysical universe that was disconnected 
from human history. As it is, the Judeo-Christian God is a Deus 
absconditus, a being that both reveals as well as conceals itself in the 
human historical world (Kołakowski, p. 149). 
 Ours, therefore, is a very conflicted culture; one in which historical 
experience of the Jews (The Covenant, The Ten Commandments, for 
the Christians the Incarnation) is confronted by the a-historical world 
of concepts that served as the foundation of all rational conduct that 
was the basis of Greek thinking:  
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Other cultures have multiple traditions - China has Taoism and Confucianism, for 
example, but these traditions normally complement each other. No culture but 
ours has two traditions so totally opposed. The Greek discovery of detached, 
disembodied, timeless, universal, reflective rationality contradicts the Hebrew 
revelation of involved, embodied, historical, local commitment. One side gives us 
our ability to think: the other, our deepest experiences.  
       (Dreyfus, p. 139) 
The following question emerges at this point: are humans moral on 
account of the actions that they commit themselves to or are they 
moral because they follow given rules that are not the product of 
reason and rational conduct but of divine revelation (The Decalogue)? 
At the same time, from the Hebrew tradition it appears that God 
communicates not with abstract entities but with individuals and there 
are no universal modes of conduct that would appeal to everyone in an 
equally effective way. Nevertheless, some regulations of social 
conduct are necessary and this is where the role of the Decalogue 
comes in. Huston Smith states that ethical rules are necessary mainly 
for social purposes, as they regulate the individual’s right to power, 
money, sex and language (Smith, p. 239).  
 
Conclusion 
Levinas sometimes attacked Christianity for not being as ethical as 
Judaism. The effect of this is the Nietzschean proclamation of the 
death of God, since it implies the eclipse of ethical values that made 
the belief in God possible. The answer to this crisis is Judaism with its 
ethicality. The Jewish understanding of a detached God is quite 
similar to the notion of the Good that we find in Plato. The Good was 
detached from the world of sense and occasionally reproduced itself in 
various incarnations, nevertheless, it was always detached from the 
world of experience. In a sense both God and the idea of the Good can 
be said to exist beyond physical being.  
 As we can see from the perspective we have outlined above, the 
human relation with God is primarily ethical in the sense that God 
speaks to the human self through the face of the other and not from 
some otherworldly transcendence. Moreover, our communication with 
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God is engendered by our communication and responsibility for the 
other. Paradoxically, this, of course, undermines the value of prayer 
which seems to be an exceptional private experience and, therefore, in 
Levinasian terms unethical. In other words, prayer is based on the 
belief in a God that is transcendent and not here in the face of the 
other. Nevertheless, in the Levinasian sense, “[t]rue prayer, then, is 
never for oneself, never for one’s own needs” ( Totality and Inifinity, 
p. 115). Bearing that in mind we come to see that theology is off to a 
bad start, since it is more concerned with finding a rational 
explanation to the being of God than an ethical one. From his 
perspective God speaks to the self from the others’ want of 
responsibility. Moreover, the name of God is ineffable, since its 
effability would automatically suggest that God’s nature can be 
reduced to the level of rationality and the point being made here is that 
God exceeds rationality. 
 All in all, the philosophical conception of God - the God of 
theology - is basically (from Levinas’ perspective) an atheistic God, 
since the road to God is based on the dictum of fides quarens 
intellectum, which means that faith predetermines understanding. 
Thus, faith is the link with the face of the other which in turn is linked 
with the face of God. Nevertheless, generally speaking we can 
distinguish between two forms of atheism. The first concerns the self 
as a detached being, a being that does not seek union with God, a 
being that is capable of such separateness. The other form of atheism 
concerns the self’s conscious denial of the existence of God. Eo ipso, 
the very idea of having a unique soul is, however paradoxically it may 
sound, an atheistic assumption. The basic danger that emanates from 
atheism is that it denies the value of morality, in other words, it is a 
return to the pagan world of myth and nature. Nevertheless, Levinas, 
whilst promoting the overall feeling of religiousness, seems to have 
taken for granted that religious thinking can be dangerous and 
intolerant in its fundamentalist sense. 
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